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Knocking Out Motor Vehicle Insurance
Household Exclusions: Does the Financial
Responsibility Law Cover All Bases?
Halpin v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.1
I. INTRODUCTION
This Note discusses the issues presented by the conflicts between
Missouri's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law,2 a legislative act
intended to provide compensation for persons injured in vehicular accidents, 3
and contractual exclusion clauses contained in motor vehicle liability insurance
policies. A "household" or "family" exclusion clause, the type of liability
insurance contract exclusion at issue in Halpin, typically states that no
coverage exists for any obligation an insured may have to a member of the
insured's family who is residing in the same household as the insured.' The
household exclusion is designed to eliminate coverage when one family
member's negligence results in liability to another family member.' Motor
vehicle insurance policies typically include other exclusionary clauses also
designed to deny coverage in specific situations, such as a household
exclusion, an "automobile business" or a business use exclusion,6 a "garage
shop" provision,7 or a named insured exclusion.'
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Halpin v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. stems from a
declaratory action brought by Donald and Rebecca Halpin as the next friends
of their children.9 The Halpins, appellants in this action, requested the
Supreme Court of Missouri to declare void as contrary to public policy the
"household exclusion clause" contained in the Halpins' auto insurance policy
with American Family Mutual Insurance Company." The accident at issue
1. 823 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 303.010-.370 (1986).
3. Atlanta Casualty Co. v. Salyer, No. 17251, 1991 WL 216277, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct.
25, 1991).
4. Robert H. Jerry II, New Developments in Kansas Insurance Law, 37 KAN. L. REV. 841,
887 (1989).
5. Id.
6. See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 541 F. Supp. 755
(N.D. Miss. 1982); Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Parker, 320 S.E.2d 458 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1984).
7. See DeWitt v. Young, 625 P.2d 478 (Kan. 1981).
8. As the name suggests, a named insured exclusion denies coverage for the policy's named
insured. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 619 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980).
9. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 480.
10. Id.
1
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occurred on May 12, 1990." The insured vehicle, driven by Rebecca
Halpin, collided with another car, injuring the two Halpin children, Jessica and
John.' 2  Respondent American Family denied coverage of a claim by the
children for injuries caused by their mother's negligence. 3 Respondent
based its denial upon a standard household exclusion clause in the insurance
contract. 4 The clause at issue stated that the policy coverage did not apply
to:
10. Bodily injury to:
a. You, a relative or any other person injured while operating your
insured car;
b. Any person related to you and residing in your household; or
c. Any person related to the operator and residing in the household
of the operator.' 5
The appellants argued for the nullification of the household exclusion
clause as contrary to the public policy of Missouri enumerated in the Motor
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (FRL). 6 The appellants contended that






16. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 303.010-.370 (1986).
17. The Halpins, appellants, based their argument upon two sections of the FRL. First, the
appellants argued that § 303.025 created a requirement of"financial responsibility." This section
reads:
1. No owner of a motor vehicle registered in this state shall operate the vehicle, or
authorize any other person to operate the vehicle, unless the owner maintains the
financial responsibility as required in this section. Furthermore, no person shall
operate a motor vehicle owned by another with the knowledge that the owner has
notmaintained financial responsibility unless such person has financial responsibility
which covers his operation of the other's vehicle.
2. A motor vehicle owner shall maintain his financial responsibility in a manner
provided for in section 303.160, or with a motor vehicle liability policy which
conforms to the requirements of the laws of this state.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.025.1, .2 (1986).
Second, the appellants argued that the financial responsibility required by § 303.025 had
to comply with the dollar terms listed in § 303.190. The pertinent parts of this section state:
Such owner's policy of liability insurance:
(2) Shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using any
such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such
named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle or motor vehicles
within the United States of America or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits,
exclusive of interest and costs, with respect to each such motor vehicle, as follows:
twenty-five thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in
any one accident and, subject to said limit for one person, fifty thousand dollars
1348 [Vol. 57
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amounts of insurance mandates that a contract of vehicle liability insurance
must provide the minimum amount of coverage, despite the exclusion
clause.'8 The net effect, the appellants asserted, is that section 303.025 and
its requirement of financial responsibility mandate coverage up to the dollar
amounts specified in section 303.190." The appellants also argued that the
household exclusion clause should be fully invalidated, thus extending
coverage to the limits listed in the insurance policy, beyond the dollar amounts
dictated by statute.2"
Respondent American Family offered several arguments against the
claims of the appellants. The respondent argued that the Missouri statutes
cannot be characterized as a compulsory insurance law because section
303.160 provides alternative methods of proving financial responsibility.2'
The respondent also maintained that the actual text of section 303.190 applies
only to policies certified in accordance with other sections of the FRL,
specifically, sections 303.170 or 303.180.' Additionally, the respondent
argued for the validity of the insurance contract containing the exclusion
clause on the grounds that the Missouri Division of Insurance had approved
the contract.Y
because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and
ten thouiand dollars because of injury to or destruction of property of others in one
accident.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.190.2 (1986) (emphasis added).
To summarize the "dollar amounts" required by § 303.190, the FRL provides a pool of
potentially recoverable insurance funds of up to $25,000 for one person. The FRL requires
$50,000 of insurance coverage available to all parties injured in one accident. For example,
suppose four persons riding in a car are injured in an accident. If the insured only has enough
insurance to meet the minimal amounts of the FRL, the most any individual could recover from
the insurance company would be $25,000, and all four injured parties could recover no more than
a total of $50,000. However, it is important to remember that the negligent party would be
liable for the amount of the judgment exceeding the amounts paid by the insurance company.
18. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 480-82. See supra note 17.
19. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 481. See supra note 17.
20. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 482. The dollar amounts are listed in § 303.190.2. See supra
note 17.
21. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 482. The four methods of proving financial responsibility listed
in § 303.160 are: (1) a certificate of insurance, or a "certified insurance policy;" (2) a bond; (3)
a certificate of deposit of money or securities; and (4) a certificate of self-insurance. Mo. REv.
STAT. § 303.160.1 (1986). This section was enacted in 1953 and was not amended by the 1986
enactment of the Financial Responsibility Law. Id.
22. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 481. Basically, a certified insurance policy is simply an
insurance policy filed with the Missouri Division of Insurance, while a noncertified policy is any
insurance policy not filed with the Division of Insurance. Sections 303.170-.180 specify the
process necessary to certify an insurance policy. Section 303.170 allows proof of financial
responsibility by filing a written certificate of insurance with the Missouri Director of Insurance.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.170 (1986). Section 303.180 applies to proof of insurance by a
nonresident, so this section is irrelevant to the issues at hand.
23. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 482.
1992] 1349
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The trial court entered judgment for respondent American Family.24
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, affirmed the trial court
decision, but transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court." After
noting the apparent legislative purpose of requiring motor vehicle liability
policies to provide statutorily limited coverage coextensive with liability,6
the supreme court partially invalidated the household exclusion clause, holding
that the public policy of the FRL requires that a liability insurance contract
provide coverage equal to the minimal amounts indicated in section
303.190.27
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Missouri Law Prior to Halpin
To begin an examination of Missouri law surrounding the validity of
household exclusions, it is appropriate to review the statutes that serve as the
basis of public policy. Missouri enacted the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsi-
bility Law (SRL) in 1953.2' This statute did not require all drivers to
maintain insurance or other means of financial responsibility; the SRL merely
required the owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in
more than $500 in damages to prove "financial responsibility."29 After a
person had been involved in an accident, the owner or operator of the vehicle
had to furnish proof of financial responsibility to avoid the possibility of
revocation of the person's driver's license or vehicle registration." This type
of law has been described as a "one free accident rule."0' Several methods
of proving financial responsibility were available under the statute.32
Under the SRL, Missouri courts consistently upheld the general validity
of household exclusion clauses.33 Missouri courts have cited freedom of
contract in liability insurance as a general principle supporting the validity of
exclusions.34 The Missouri Supreme Court, in Harrison v. MFA Mutual
24. Id. at 480.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 482.
27. Id. at 482-83. See supra note 17.
28. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 303.010-.370 (1986).
29. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 481-82. Ifadriverneededto show financial responsibility under
the Safety Responsibility Law, she could do so by any of the methods specified in § 303.160.
See supra note 21. The dollar amounts of the current § 303.190 were applicable to the SRL.
See supra note 17.
30. Protective Casualty Ins. Co. v. Cook, 734 S.W.2d 898, 906-07 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
31. See 12-A GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 45:721 (2d ed. 1981).
32. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.160 (1986). See supra note 21 for the means of proving
financial responsibility listed in § 303.160.
33. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 789 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1990); State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co. v. Ward, 340 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1960).
34. See Ward, 789 S.W.2d at 795; Hines v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 656 S.W.2d
262, 265 (Mo. 1983).
1350 [Vol. 57
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Insurance Co.,35 held that an unambiguous and unequivocal family exclusion
clause is effective.36 The Harrison court decried creating "an ambiguity
under the [insurance] policy language where none exists so as to construe the
imaginary ambiguity in such a way to reach a result which some might
consider desirable but which is not otherwise permissible under the policy or
the law."37  In American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ward,3" the
Supreme Court of Missouri again refused to invalidate a household exclusion
clause, despite the abolition of interspousal immunity.39 The Ward court
classified the procurement and extent of vehicular liability insurance as a
voluntary measure; therefore, the parties could agree to any lawful and
reasonable terms, including exclusions.4"
B. Evolution Into Current Missouri Law-Issues Facing
the Halpin Court
Missouri's Safety Responsibility Law experienced a severe facelift when
the 1986 Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law was enacted, effective
July 1, 1987.4' The Financial Responsibility Law (FRL) repealed only
particular sections of the previous Safety Responsibility Law, leaving the great
majority of the prior law effective.42 The new law applies to any accident
occurring after July 1, 1987.4' The provisions of the FRL are only a few
years old; consequently, little judicial interpretation of the law has been
offered.
Because Halpin introduced a case of first impression to the Missouri
Supreme Court, several issues were presented to the court. These issues,
highlighted in the forthcoming sections of this Note, include: (1) the
inconsistencies within the current statutory framework determining appropriate
methods of sustaining financial responsibility; (2) the general nature of the
new law, as either a compulsory or noncompulsory insurance law; (3) the
validity of household exclusions in light of the public policy espoused by the
FRL; and (4) assuming invalidity of household exclusions as being void as
against public policy, determining whether the exclusions are void only up to
the dollar amounts of coverage specified in section 303.19044 or completely
void, thus allowing the entire coverage provided in the individual policy.
35. 607 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. 1980).
36. Id. at 142.
37. Id.
38. 789 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1990).
39. Ward, 789 S.W.2d at 796. Missouri abolished spousal immunity for negligent torts in
S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. 1986).
40. Ward, 789 S.W.2d at 795.
41. The title of Chapter 303 was renamed the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law
from the previous Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.010 (1986).
42. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 480.
43. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haney, 824 S.W.2d 949, 953 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); see also
Ward, 789 S.W.2d at 796-797 (Covington, J., concurring).
44. See supra note 17.
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1. The Statutory Inconsistencies of
the Financial Responsibility Law
The Financial Responsibility Law made several important additions to the
old statute. The new law added section 303.025, providing that "[n]o owner
of a motor vehicle registered in this state shall operate the vehicle. . ., unless
the owner maintains the financial responsibility as required in this section."4
This section also decrees that a "motor vehicle owner shall maintain his
financial responsibility in a manner provided for in section 303.160, or with
a motor vehicle liability policy which conforms to the requirements of the
laws of this state.,4 6 The requirement of maintaining financial responsibility
conforming to the laws of Missouri implicates section 303.190, which
delineates the actual dollar amounts required to satisfy financial responsibili-
ty.". The FRL, section 303.025 in particular, mandates that financial
responsibility be maintained before a vehicle can be operated, regardless of
past driving history.48
The statutory mandate of financial responsibility presents the problem of
ascertaining the methods of financial responsibility authorized by the
legislature. Subsection 2 of section 303.025 states that the financial
responsibility required can be satisfied by a motor vehicle policy in conformi-
ty with the laws of Missouri or in any manner listed in section 303.160. 4"
Section 303.160 had been a part of the old Safety Responsibility Law, and
was not repealed by the 1986 amendments. This section authorized proof of
financial responsibility by four various means: (1) a certified motor vehicle
policy; (2) posting a bond; (3) a certificate of self-insurance; or (4) by posting
a certificate of deposit.5" Thus, the current Missouri statute recognizes
certified and noncertified insurance policies.5 ' Herein definitional inconsisten-
cies arise.
While section 303.025.2 allows noncertified policies to satisfy the
financial responsibility requirements, section 303.190.1 defines a motor vehicle
liability policy as a policy "certified as provided in section 303.170. "s2
Because the legislature did not amend the section 303.190 definition of "motor
vehicle liability policy" to comport with the 1986 addition of section 303.025,
the dollar figures of section 303.190 apply only to a certified policy, if one13
applies a literal interpretation to the two statutes. The discrepancies
between the various sections of the current law have evoked arguments that
45. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.025 (1986). See supra note 17 for the full text of this section.
46. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.025 (1986). See supra note 17.
47. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.190 (1986). See supra note 17.
48. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Monday, No. WD44299, 1991 WL 179383, at *I
(Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1991).
49. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 303.025 (1986).
50. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.160 (1986).
51. Monday, 1991 WL 179383, at *2. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 303.025, 303.160 (1986).
52. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.190.2 (1986).
53. See Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 481; Monday, 1991 WL 179383, at *2.
1352 [Vol. 57
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the FRL does not apply to the standard, noncertified vehicle liability insurance
policy."4
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Monday,"s the
insurer raised such an argument, contending that the financial provisions of the
law do not apply to a noncertified policy. 6 The Missouri Court of Appeals,
Western District, looked to canons of statutory construction to address the
inconsistencies between the old and new sections of the law." The court
stated that "where an unaltered section and the amendment cannot be
reconciled, the provisions of the amendato2 act, which is the last expression
of the will of the legislature, must prevail." Supported by rules of statutory
construction, the Monday court held that a noncertified insurance policy is an
authorized method of showing financial responsibility. 9 The Monday court
reasoned that "it is necessary to delete" any language stating that only a
certified policy must meet the terms of the FRL.6"
2. Is the FRL a Compulsory Insurance Law?
After resolving the discrepancies between the old and new sections of the
FRL, another important issue remains: Is the FRL a compulsory insurance
law? While difficulties may arise in labeling a statute as a "compulsory
insurance law" or a "financial responsibility law," commentators have pointed
out basic differences between the two general types of laws.6 Compulsory
insurance laws are intended to be a condition for any operation of a motor
vehicle for the unlimited class of all motorists.62 Financial responsibility
laws generally apply to a limited class of motorists, most often a class of
people who have been involved in accidents or had a driver's license
revoked.6' According to a renowned commentator on insurance law, George
Couch, "[t]he basic problem with this type of statute [financial responsibility
statutes] is that the motorist is entitled to one free accident." Couch
54. See Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 481; Monday, 1991 WL 179383, at *2.
55. No. WD44299, 1991 WL 179383 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1991).
56. Monday, 1991 WL 179383, at *2-3.
57. Id. at *3.
58. Id. (quoting IA JABEz G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 22.35 (4th ed.
1985)).
59. Id. at *4.
60. Id.
61. Classifications ofstatutes as compulsory ornoncompulsory are typically generalizations.
The innumerable subtle differences among state insurance statutes clouds the accuracy of
classifying a particular statute as a compulsory insurance law or as any other type of law. See
American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 789 S.W.2d 791, 796 n.2 (Mo. 1990) (Covington, J.,
concurring).
62. See COUCH, supra note 31, § 45:721; 7 AM. JUR. 2DAutomobile Insurance § 20 (1980).
63. See COUCH, supra note 31, § 45:721; 7 AM. JuR. 2DAutomobile Insurance § 20 (1980).
64. COUCH, supra note 31, § 45:721.
1992] 1353
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concluded that such a financial responsibility law "provides little consolation
to the victim of the first accident.,
65
The confusion created by affixing the labels of "compulsory" and
"financial responsibility" is apparent. The confusion is magnified upon
consideration of the history of Missouri's legislative attempts in this area.
Missouri's pre-1987 Safety Responsibility Law corresponds to the
commentators' generic classification of financial responsibility laws.6 The
name "Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law" would seem to suggest
that the current FRL is a stereotypical financial responsibility law, but prior
to Halpin, Missouri courts had not agreed upon the type of insurance
requirement the FRL created.67
Two Missouri courts have addressed this issue in dicta. 8 In Protective
Casualty Co. v. Cook,69 the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District,
distinguished compulsory insurance and financial responsibility acts, then
stated, "[A] number of states have enacted laws which require an owner or
operator to carry liability insurance in order for the vehicle to be operated on
the public highways. This is what Missouri will have effective July 1,
1987."70 However, the same court of appeals said in American Standard
Insurance Co. v. Dolphin7 that "the Missouri legislature did not enact a
mandatory automobile insurance law, but rather a, mandatory financial
responsibility law."72 Clearly, a uniform understanding of the FRL has not
been reached.
3. Validity of Household Exclusions in Light of the FRL
Regardless of the characterizationof the current Missouri law, the central
issue facing the Halpin court was determining whether a household exclusion
clause was void as against the public policy manifested in the FRL. The
Supreme Court of Missouri entertained this public policy argument in
American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ward.' The accident at issue in
Ward occurred on March 16, 1985, well before the passage of the FRL or its
effective date.74 The court ruled that because the wreck antedated the FRL,
considerations of public policy were to be extrapolated from the Safety
65. Id.
66. See supra notes 28-32, 61-65 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., American Standard Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Dolphin, 801 S.W.2d 413, 415
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Protective Casualty Ins. Co. v. Cook, 734 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987).
68. Dolphin, 801 S.W.2d at 415; Cook, 734 S.W.2d at 906.
69. 734 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. Ct. App: 1987).
70. Id. at 906.
71. 801 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. CL App. 1990).
72. Id. at 415.
73. 789 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1990).
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Responsibility Law.75 Although the court rejected the insured's public policy
argument,76 Judge Covington's concurring opinion left the door open for
future arguments that household exclusions are void as against public
policy.77  Covington postulated that the "cumulative effect" of the adoption
of rights of contribution, enactment of the FRL, and the abolition of spousal
immunity78 may well have favored the insured's argument under current
public policy, but that current public policy did not govern the specific case
of Ward.79
Prior to Halpin, the Missouri Court of Appeals addressed public policy
arguments contesting the validity of insurance exclusions in three cases
stemming from accidents occurring after the effective date of the FRL.8° In
American Standard Insurance Co. v. Dolphin,8 the court dealt with a
"passenger exclusion""2 clause in a motorcycle liability insurance policy."
The Dolphin court admitted that the FRL is not a mandatory insurance law.84
However, the court found that regardless of the passenger exclusion clause or
the fact that the policy was not certified,85 the parties intended that the policy
conform to the FRL.86 The court then held the passenger exclusion to be
contrary to the public policy of Missouri as expressed in section
303.190.2(2).87
Just as in Halpin, the issue of the validity of household exclusion clauses
was before the Missouri Court of Appeals in State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Monday.88 The Monday court rejected the insurer's
75. Ward, 789 S.W.2d at 795.
76. Id. at 796.
77. Id. at 797 (Covington, J., concurring).
78. Missouri adopted rights of contribution among tortfeasors in Missouri Pacific Railroad
Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978). The FRL was enacted in 1986.
Spousal immunity for negligent torts was abolished by S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo.
1986).
79. Ward, 789 S.W.2d at 797.
80. Atlanta Casualty Co. v. Salyer, No. 17251, 1991 WL 216277 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 25,
1991); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Monday, No. WD44299, 1991 WL 179383 (Mo. Ct.
App. Sept. 17, 1991); American Standard Ins. Co. v. Dolphin, 801 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990).
81. 801 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
82. As the name suggests, a passenger exclusion denies insurance coverage to any person
riding in or on a vehicle with the named insured.
83. Dolphin, 801 S.W.2d at 414.
84. Id. at 415. For a discussion of compulsory and noncompulsory insurance laws, see
supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
85. Dolphin, 801 S.W.2d at 416. See supra notes 22, 50-54 and accompanying text.
86. Dolphin, 801 S.W.2d at 416.
87. Id. at 414-15. In citing § 303.190.2, the court referred to this operative language:
"[s]uch owner's policy of liability insurance: ... (2) [s]hall insure ... against loss from the
liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such
motor vehicle." Mo. PMv. STAT. § 303.190.2 (1986).
88. No. WD44299, 1991 WL 179383 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1991).
1992] 1355
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argument based upon the definitional inconsistencies within the FRL 9
Citing with approval the Dolphin court's invalidation of a passenger exclusion
clause, the Monday court held that because a household exclusion denies
coverage for liability which the FRL recognizes a duty to provide, the
exclusion is void as against public policy.'
In Atlanta Casualty Co. v. Salyer,9 the Missouri Court of Appeals,
Southern District, dealt with the validity of a "business use" exclusion." The
Salyer court cited the recent holdings of Dolphin and Monday, noting each
case rendered an exclusion clause void as against public policy.93 The Salyer
court also recognized that business use limitations and other types of
exclusions have been ruled invalid under motor vehicle financial responsibility
laws similar to those in Missouri.9' The Salyer court opined that "[t]he
purpose of The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law is to require
insurance coverage or other financial responsibility for damages caused by
vehicles. To allow only coverage in certain situations depending on the acts
of the driver or the particular insurance policy would thwart the purpose of the
act."' s Accordingly, the Salyer court invalidated the business use exclusion
on grounds of public policy.'
4. Assuming Invalidity, Are Household Exclusions
Fully Void or Partially Void?
Even if Missouri courts find that the FRL renders household exclusions
void as against public policy, another issue remains. Serious ramifications
stem from the decision to fully or partially invalidate a contract exclusion. If
the exclusion is declared fully invalid, coverage would exist up to the full
limits of that particular policy. However, if the exclusion is partially
invalidated, coverage would exist only up to the dollar amounts prescribed in
89. Id. at *3-4. For a full discussion of the definitional problems in the FRL, see supra
notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
90. Monday, 1991 WL 179383 at *4.
91. No. 17251, 1991 WL 216277 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1991).
92. The catch phrase "business use exclusion" is also self-explanatory. The policy at issue
in Salyer stated that it did not provide liability coverage for "any person's liability arising out
of the ownership or operation of a vehicle while it is being used to carry persons or property for
a fee." Id. at *1.
93. Id. at *2.
94. Id. (citing DeWitt v. Young, 625 P.2d 478 (Kan. 1981) (household and garage shop
exclusions); Tahash v. Flint Dodge Co., 321 N.W.2d 698 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (automobile
dealer's escape clause); Estate of Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 566 P.2d 481 (Nev. 1977)
(household exclusion); Hartford Accident Indem. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 400 A.2d 862 (N.J.
1979) (automobile business); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co, 194 S.E.2d 834
(N.C. 1973) (automobile business); Allstate Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 619 P.2d 329
(Utah 1980) (named driver exclusion); Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 611 P.2d 1304
(Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (family or household exclusion)).
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section 303.190. 97 For example, suppose a liability policy provides $500,000
in coverage. If an exclusion is fully invalidated, the injured plaintiff could
recover up to $500,000 from the insurance company. If the exclusion is
partially invalidated, the insurance company would only be liable for a
maximum of $25,000 to an individual plaintiff or up to $50,000 regardless of
the number of injured parties.98
While the Dolphin and Monday opinions did not mention the potential
distinction between a total and partial invalidation of an exclusion clause, the
Salyer court expressly avoided the issue.99 Consequently, no Missouri court
had addressed this question prior to Halpin.
C. Household Exclusions and Uninsured Motorist Provisions
The FRL mandate of financial responsibility and Missouri's requirement
of uninsured motorist insurance" combined to present the Halpin court with
another interesting dilemma. Designed under the pragmatic realization that
not all drivers will purchase liability insurance, the uninsured motorist statute
is a protective measure providing limited insurance coverage in situations
where the negligent driver was uninsured. The purpose of the uninsured
motorist law is to give an insured person coverage equal to the amount of
coverage required by the minimum amounts listed in the financial responsibili-
ty law, regardless of whether the negligent driver causing a collision is insured
or uninsured.'
In Hoerath v. McMahan, 2 the driver and a passenger injured in an
auto accident were excluded from coverage under a household exclusion. 3
The two plaintiffs argued that because they were denied coverage by the
household exclusion, the automobile was uninsured as to each person's
injuries."° Both plaintiffs argued that because the vehicle was uninsured as
to their injuries, each of them should be able to recover under the uninsured
motor vehicle provision of the policy. 5 The Hoerath court stated that the
purpose of section 379.203 is to protect insured persons from owners or
operators of uninsured vehicles.' Refuting the plaintiffs' argument, the
court ruled that the vehicle at issue was insured.'0 Because of the house-
hold exclusion and the fact that the insured vehicle was not an "uninsured
97. See supra note 17.
98. See supra note 17.
99. Salyer, 1991 WL 216277, at *2.
100. Mo. REV. STAT. § 379.203 (1986).
101. Famuliner v. Farmers Ins. Co., 619 S.W.2d 894, 896-97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
102. 669 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
103. Id. at 282.
104. Id. at 282-83.
105. Id.
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vehicle" under the statute, the plaintiffs in Hoerath could not recover under
the policy or the statute.'
Hoerath reaches a seemingly contradictory result: A driver that is not
insured as a result of a household exclusion clause is not an uninsured
motorist under section 379.203. Thus, no insurance coverage is afforded.
Applying the Hoerath result to the situation in Halpin, it is apparent that the
Halpin children, excluded under a household exclusion, also would not be able
to recover under the uninsured motorist provision.
D. Comparable Law of Other Jurisdictions
Despite the fact that the Halpin opinion cited only one non-Missouri
case,"°9 decisions from other jurisdictions can provide insight into the Halpin
decision. Before embarking upon a survey of the law of other states, it is
important to recognize that each state has unique statutory insurance law and
rules of tort immunity."0 Like Missouri, several other states have recently
amended statutes or modified case law related to the validity of insurance
contract exclusions"' Because of the differences in statutes and court
interpretations, any conclusions drawn from comparisons of holdings of other
states should be qualified. The two issues presented in Halpin which are most
suitable for comparison to provisions of other states are the determination of
whether exclusions are void as against public policy and, assuming the
exclusions are invalidated, the determination of. whether the exclusion is
partially or completely invalidated.
One feature that distinguishes various state statutes is characterization as
a compulsory or noncompulsory insurance statute. This general characteriza-
tion is highly relevant to determining the validity of exclusion clauses. A
household exclusion, or any type of exclusion, effectively renders a driver or
vehicle owner uninsured as to those persons affected by the exclusion." 2
Thus, if a statute is interpreted to require insurance or financial responsibility,
a driver or owner is uninsured by operation of the exclusion and is most likely
in violation of the statute."' Clauses in insurance contracts which attempt
to exclude, dilute, or condition statutorily mandated coverage are invalid or
void."4 Even if a statute does not mandate insurance, the contract exclusion
may still be invalidated on account of general public policy."5
108. Id.
109. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Henry, 563 N.E.2d 1265 (Ind. 1990).
110. See American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 789 S.W.2d 791, 796 n.2 (Mo. 1990).
111. Id.
112. Bishop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 623 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Ky. 1981).
113. Meyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 585, 589 (Colo. 1984); DeWitt v.
Young, 625 P.2d 478, 482 (Kan. 1981).
114. Meyer, 689 S.W.2d at 589; Bishop, 623 S.W.2d at 866.
115. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dimmer, 773 P.2d 1012 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988);
see generally Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARv. L. REv. 961 (1970).
[Vol. 571358
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss4/7
1 THE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITYLAW
Despite distinctions in statutory framework, most jurisdictions have ruled
that exclusion clauses in vehicle insurance policies are void."6 A few courts
have extended the rationale behind invalidation beyond the idea that the
exclusion detracts from the public policy articulated in that state's statute. 17
The Washington Supreme Court, in Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v.
Wiscomb,"' claimed that the household exclusion has the effect of prevent-
ing a specific class of innocent victims, family members in particular, from
insurance protection."9 The Washington court opined that the exclusion of
such a large class is "particularly disturbing when viewed in light of the fact
that this class of victims is the one most frequently exposed to the potential
negligence of the named insured."'2 The abolition of intrafamily immunity
is also a persuasive argument for the invalidation of household or family
exclusion clauses.'2 ' A legislative or judicial decision to abolish intrafamily
immunities reflects a policy view that family members should be allowed to
recover damages from each other; household exclusions certainly impede such
a legislative or judicial policy decision.
A decreasing number of jurisdictions support the validity of vehicle
insurance contract exclusions. ' Arguments against the invalidation of
exclusions have looked to two general lines for justification. The first
argument contends that household or family exclusion clauses are intended to
protect insurers from collusion which might arise in intrafamily lawsuits.'
Courts have considered claims that the natural tendency of an insured is to
strengthen or enlarge the case against oneself when the case involves family
members.'24
116. Arceneaux v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 550 P.2d 87 (Ariz. 1976); DeWitt v.
Young, 625 P.2d 478 (Kan. 1981); Bishop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 623 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1981);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sivey, 272 N.W.2d 555 (Mich. 1978); Transamerica Ins. Co.
v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820 (Mont. 1983); Estate of Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 566 P.2d 81 (Nev.
1977); Kish v. Motor Club of Am. Ins. Co., 261 A.2d 662 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert.
denied, 264 A.2d 68 (N.J. 1970); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Anzalone, 462 N.Y.S.2d 738 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1983); Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 236 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1975); Jordan v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 214 S.E.2d 818 (S.C. 1975); Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v.
Wiscomb, 643 P.2d 441 (Wash. 1982); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wyoming Ins. Dept., 672 P.2d 810
(Wyo. 1983).
117. See supra note 115.
118. 643 P.2d 441 (Wash. 1982).
119. Id. at 444.
120. Id.
121. See Gerald G. Ashdown, Intrafamily Immunity, Pure Compensation, and the Family
Exclusion Clause, 60 IOWA L. REV. 239, 248-49 (1974).
122. Hutchenson v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 435 So. 2d 734 (Ala.
1983); Cook v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 772 S.W.2d 614 (Ark. 1989); Farmers Ins. Exch.
v. Cocking, 628 P.2d I (Cal. 1981); Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 507 P.2d 6 (Or. 1973).
123. Meyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 585, 591 (Colo. 1984); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traycik, 272 N.W.2d 629, 630 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); Lee, 507 P.2d at
8.
124. Wiscomb, 622 P.2d at 1235.
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Several responses to the "possibility of collusion argument" have been
advanced. Of course, states that have abolished doctrines of spousal and
parental immunity have previously discounted the validity of this "possibility
of collusion" argument." The Washington Supreme Court, in Wiscomb,
cited the ability of the judicial system to "ferret out the meritorious from the
fraudulent" as a protection from collusive intrafamily lawsuits. 6 Prompt,
effective insurance company investigation and timely report requirements,
which act to quickly establish the essential facts of a potential lawsuit, have
also been cited as safeguards against collusive lawsuits. 27
The second general line of argument against the invalidation of
exclusions focuses on the freedom to bargain over contractual terms. Missouri
law typifies the law of most states' in providing that parties to a contract
may agree to terms as they wish, as long as the contract is lawful and
reasonable. 29
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Porter v. Farmers Insurance Co. of
Idaho,3 based its holding on this rationale.' The court noted that the
insurance policy at issue p1rovided coverage to "any person," but was followed
by thirteen exclusions.' The court ruled that the insured's argument for
voidness basically sought to eliminate any provision reducing the scope of the
term "any person."' The Idaho court held that "the parties to a contract
must be free to insure exactness in contracting by modifying and defining
words in the contract, as long as the language is clear and unambiguous."'
34
One case of particular interest to the Halpin court was Transamerica
Insurance Co. v. Henry. 35 In Henry, the Indiana Supreme Court called the
statute at issue a "compulsory financial responsibility" law.'3 6 The statute
provided several methods of procuring financial responsibility, and required
such procurement as a condition of operating a vehicle.137 In holding that
125. Meyer, 689 P.2d at 591.
126. Wiscomb, 622 P.2d at 1236 (citing Freeche v. Freeche, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (Wash.
1972)).
127. Meyer, 689 P.2d at 591 (citing Sorenson v. Sorenson, 339 N.E.2d 907, 915 (Mass.
1975)).
128. 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 160 (1982).
129. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 789 S.W.2d 791, 795 (Mo. 1990).
130. 627 P.2d 311 (1981). However, Idaho has enacted a compulsory insurance statute
since the Porter decision. Household exclusions were ruled invalid under this new statute in
Farmers Insurance Group v. Reed, 712 P.2d 550, 553 (Idaho 1985).




135. 563 N.E.2d 1265 (Ind. 1990). This was the only non-Missouri case cited in the Halpin
opinion. The statute at issue in Henry, IND. CODE § 9-1.4-3.5 (1990), has been repealed and
replaced by IND. CODE § 9-25-2 (1992). The change in this statute should not affect the validity
of the Henry holding.
136. Id. at 1268.
137. Id. at 1267-68.
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household exclusions are not void as against the public policy of the statute,
the court stated that the Indiana law did not "evince a social policy to
guarantee compensation for all victims of automobile accidents.' 38
As discussed earlier, state courts that rule exclusions void as against
public policy must choose whether to partially or completely invalidate
exclusions. 3 The rationale typically offered for partial invalidation is that
the exclusion is invalid only to the extent it violates the statutory require-
ments. 4 Another reason given for partial invalidations is that in the
absence of statutory requirements, the exclusion clauses would be effec-
tive.'41 State statutes often specify that liability insurance exceeding that
amount necessitated by statute is not subject to the provisions of that law. 42
However, a few courts have fully invalidated exclusion clauses, resulting
in insurance coverage up to the limits of the particular policy. 43 Two basic
arguments have been employed to support complete invalidation. In Meyer
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,' the Colorado Supreme
Court rationalized that where a contract provision is void as against public
policy, the remaining portions are enforceable to the extent that the illegal
provision can be separated from the legal terms of the contract."' The court
also based its holding on the public policy evidenced by the insurance statute,
reasoning that extending coverage to the policy limits "is more consistent with
the legislative intent and policy which is to maximize rather than minimize
insurance coverage."'46 Thus, the Meyer court allowed insurance coverage
up to the limits stated in the particular policy. 47
A second argument used to completely invalidate exclusion clauses is
derived from an "objectively reasonable expectations" analysis of insurance
contracts. 4  This analysis contends that policy language should be
construed as reasonable laypersons would understand, not according to the
policyholder's actual knowledge or the interpretation of sophisticated
underwriters.'49 This theory even upholds the layperson's expectations
where that person would have understood the exclusion that defeats the
138. Id. at 1268.
139. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
140. DeWitt v. Young, 625 P.2d 478, 483 (Kan. 1981); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Shelly, 231 N.W.2d 641, 642, (Mich. 1975); Estate of Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 566 P.2d 81,
83 (Nev. 1977).
141. Arceneaux v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 550 P.2d 87, 89 (Ariz. 1976); DeWitt,
625 P.2d at 483; Estate of Neal, 566 P.2d at 83.
142. E.g., Mo. Rlv. STAT. § 303.190.7 (1986).
143. Meyer, 689 P.2d at 592; Kish v. Motor Club of Am. Ins. Co., 261 A.2d 662, 666 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970); Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870, 886
(N.D. 1975).
144. 689 P.2d 585 (Colo. 1984).
145. Meyer, 689 P.2d at 593.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 592-93.
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expectations at issue had she "made a painstaking study of the contract."'50
The Arizona Court of Appeals, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Dimmer,' held a household exclusion fully void where the exclusion
clause violated the reasonable expectations principle." 2 Citing section 211
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,'53 the court stated that a consumer
is "not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable
expectation."'' The court took notice of the fact that the declarations page
of the Dimmers' policy clearly stated their coverage limits, while a household
exclusion clause listed on page six of a fifteen-page policy excluded part of
that coverage.' The court fully invalidated the exclusion clause, conclud-
ing that a reasonably intelligent consumer without legal experience would not
know that coverage denied by a household exclusion is equal only to the limits
required by law.'
IV. THE HALPIN DECISION
Before delving into the arguments advanced by each party, the Halpin
court briefly summarized the history of Missouri's legislative attempts in the
area of motor vehicle insurance. is Justice Blackmar's majority opinion
noted that the FRL, as opposed to the old law, requires financial responsibility
without regard to driving history.5 8
The first contention entertained by the Halpin court was the respondent's
argument that the FRL is not a compulsory insurance law because section
303.160 provides alternative means for supplying evidence of financial
responsibility. 59 The Halpin court did not hide its opinion of the drafts-
manship of the law, stating that "[t]he legislature has invited confusion by
blending the old and the new."'" The Halpin majority embraced a realistic
approach, asserting that the great majority of motor vehicle owners will
maintain financial responsibility through liability insurance policies.'' The
court declared that the "statute is, for all practical purposes, a compulsory
insurance law.' 62
150. Id.
151. 773 P.2d 1012 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
152. Id. at 1021.
153. Id. at 1016-18.
154. Id. at 1017 (quoting Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682
P.2d 388, 396-97, (Aiz. Ct. App. 1984)). The Dimmer and Darner opinions extensively relied
upon § 211 and comment (f) to § 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
155. Dimmer, 773 P.2d 1012, 1019.
156. Id. at 1020.
157. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 480-82.
158. Id. at 480.
159. Id. at 481. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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In response to the insurer's argument that the statute applies only to
certified policies, the Halpin opinion again refers to the inconsistencies
between the old and new sections of the statute.63 Recognizing that proof
of insurance is required regardless of driving history, the court proclaimed that
the FRL would be ineffective if applied only to certified policies.' Thus,
the FRL will be applied to all insurance policies.
61
The Halpin court next addressed State Farm's argument for validity of
the household exclusion clause due to the approval of the insurance contract
by the Missouri Division of Insurance." The court summarily refused this
argument, ruling that the Director of Insurance cannot usurp the courts' role
in interpreting the public policy of insurance policies. 67 Emphasizing that
matters of public policy are for the judicial branch, the opinion held that the
failure of the Director of Insurance to reject a contract provision does not
make the provision legitimate.
6 1
Justice Blackmar's opinion next applied the public policy elucidated in
the FRL to the problem presented by the household exclusion in this case.
69
Having clarified the role of the judiciary as interpreters of public policy, the
majority announced that "[t]he plain purpose of the 1986 amendment is to
make sure that people who are injured on the highways may collect damage
awards, within limjts, against negligent motor vehicle operators."77 Thus,
the purpose of the law would be not be completely fulfilled if the household
exclusion were fully enforced.' The court rejected the approach espoused
in Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Henry,'72 where the Indiana Supreme
Court upheld the validity of household exclusions under a statutory scheme
very similar to Missouri law. Thus, the Halpin majority held that the
household exclusion violated the public policy of the FRL.' 74
163. Id. at 481-82.
164. Id. at 482. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
165. Id.
166. Id. The insurer relied on § 303.025.3, a 1986 provision that states:
Nothing in sections 303.010 to 303.050, 303.060, 303.140, 303.220, 303:290,
303.330 and 303.370 shall be construed as prohibiting the division of insurance from
approving or authorizing those exclusions and limitations which are contained in
automobile liability insurance policies...
Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.025.3 (1986).
The insurer argued that this provision, coupled with § 375.920 which mandates approval
of insurance contracts by the division of insurance, rendered the household exclusion valid.






172. 563 N.E.2d 1265 (Ind. 1990). Amicus curiae briefs argued heavily for the position
taken in Henry. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 482.
173. Henry, 563 N.E.2d at 1268-69. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
174. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 482.
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The court next addressed the Halpins' contention that the household
exclusion should be rendered completely void.' In rejecting the Halpins'
claim, the court relied primarily upon section 303.190.7,176 stating that a
liability insurance policy in conformity with the FRL can provide coverage
exceeding the statutory minimum amounts without subjecting that excess
amount to the requirements of the FRL. 77 The majority cited Missouri
cases supporting the freedom of contract in liability insurance. 17' The
opinion also stated that when insurance contract language is clear, exceptions
based on public policy must find support through the necessary implications
of statutes.179  The necessary implications of the FRL require that the
household exclusion be invalidated only up to the amounts provided in section
303.190.80
Chief Justice Robertson was the lone dissenter in the Halpin decision.
A fact crucial to Judge Robertson's contentions was that the wreck at issue
occurred before the abolition of parental immunity by the Missouri Supreme
Court in Hartman v. Hartman."' Robertson's dissent focused on the
premise that the public policy rendering the household exclusion invalid was
also effectuated by the abolition of parental immunity, not solely by the
enactment of the FRL."82 Robertson asserted that at the time of the Halpins'
accident and at the time the policy was issued, Missouri's doctrine of parental
immunity forbade the Halpin children from seeking recovery from their
parents.'83 The dissent added that the exclusion clause accurately reflected
the law and the parents' potential liability to their children at the time the
contract was made.' Thus, the public policy of the FRL could not render
the exclusion void, because the law effective at the time of the accident placed
175. Id. at482-83. Fora complete discussion oftheramifications of declaring the exclusion
either partially or completely void, see supra notes 97-99, 139-56 and accompanying text.
176. The full text of this section says:
Any policy which grants the coverage required for a motor vehicle liability policy
may also grant any lawful coverage in excess of or in addition to the coverage
specified for a motor vehicle liability policy and such excess or additional coverage
shall not be subject to the provisions of this chapter. With respect to a policy which
grants such excess or additional coverage the term 'motor vehicle policy' shall apply
only to that part of the coverage which is required by this section.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.190.7 (1986).
177. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 483.
178. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 483 (citing Rodriguez v. General Accident Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d
379 (Mo. 1991); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 789 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1990); Hines
v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 656 S.W.2d 262 (Mo. 1983); Cano v. Travelers Ins. Co., 656
S.W.2d 266 (Mo. 1983)).
179. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 483.
180. Id. See supra note 17.
181. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 484. The Halpin accident occurred on May 2, 1990, id. at 480,
while the Hartman decision was handed down December 17, 1991. Hartman v. Hartman, 821
S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991).
182. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 484-45.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 485.
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no liability upon the parents to their children, and the public policy of
Missouri required insurance only where liability existed. 85
The dissent criticized the majority for a retroactive imposition of current
public policy.'86 Robertson quoted Judge Covington's concurrence in Ward,
stating, "Whatever the public policy now espoused by the State of Missouri
, this Court should not by judicial fiat retroactively impose that policy on
ilis antecedent insurance contract."'87 Robertson found that neither party in
this case intended to insure the Halpin children, and this intention was stated
in the plain language of the policy.
While the majority opinion did not mention the abolition of parental
immunity, Judge Thomas incorporated the Hartman decision into his
concurring opinion.189 Concurring in the result and the rationale of the
majority decision, Thomas sought to express the impact of the public polic,
of the FRL upon the insurance policy in a slightly different manner.
Judge Thomas asserted that
the public policy inherent in the statute creates an implicit agreement in
American Family's policy that, to the extent of the limits required by the
Financial Responsibility Act, the provisions concerning coverage will
automatically change to conform to any changes in the law of Missouri
related to the "liability imposed by law for damages arising out of... use
of such motor vehicle."2'9
Thomas commented that by choosing to write a policy in Missouri, an insurer
agrees to insure pursuant to any changes in the common law that occur during
the duration of the policy. This agreement creates a result that is not
retroactively imposed upon the insurer."9 Stated simply, the scope of the
household exclusion changed as the Missouri law concerning parental
immunity changed.93
In discussing the additional burden placed upon insurers, Thomas
recognized that the additional cost of increased coverage created by an
expansion of liability must be borne by either the insurer or the insured.'94
According to Thomas, the public policy of the FRL dictates that this cost
should fall upon the insurer.95 Qualifying the notion that all additional cost
falls upon the insurer, Thomas asserted that the cost of any damage award
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. (quoting American Family Ins. Co. v. Ward, 789 S.W.2d 791, 797 (Mo. 1990)
(Covington, J., concurring)).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 483-84 (Thomas, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 483.
191. Id. (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.190.2 (1986)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
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above the statutory minimum amounts eventually will be incurred by the
insured. 9 ' Thomas also noted that insurers may also benefit from future
constrictions in tort liability.'
97
V. ANALYSIS
A. Critique of the Halpin Decision
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the result reached by the Halpin
majority, it is clear that the legislature's poor drafting of the FRL complicates
interpretation and invites meticulous arguments against application of the law.
The majority opinion vociferously states its thoughts about the quality of the
drafting of the FRL." The FRL is a target worthy of legislative revision.
Legislative amendments could clarify disputes as to the proper methods of
financial responsibility. The 1986 amendments evidence a legislative intent
to mandate insurance coverage for all vehicle owners and operators; the
Missouri Supreme Court has held that the practical effect of the amendments
is to "compel" insurance coverage.'" If the legislature wishes to require
insurance coverage, it should repeal and revise those sections of the FRL
providing for antiquated alternative means of proving financial responsibili-
ty." In addition, if the legislature believes that the Halgin decision and the
trend in Missouri case law the decision represents 2' are not accurate
statements of public policy, the legislature should enact amendments
illuminating a new manifestation of public policy.
The Halpin court was certainly justified in disregarding the definitional
inconsistencies that would render the FRL inapplicable to noncertified
policies." If the majority had accepted the insurer's argument that the FRL
applies only to certified policies, 3 the enactment of the 1986 amendments
would have had no real effect. The court was also correct in rejecting the
insurer's claim for the validity of the household exclusion because of the
approval of the contract by the division of insurance.2°  The insurer's
argument would have basically removed judicial power to declare public
policy in the context of insurance contracts. The court refuted the two
arguments discussed above in short order, and the determination of these two
issues will likely go unquestioned.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. The majority opinion described the legislature's "method of expression" as "inartistic,"
noted the "anachronistic features of the statute," and expounded that the "legislature has invited
confusion" through the poor drafting of the statute. Id. at 481-82.
199. Id. at 481.
200. See supra notes 45-60, 159-65 and accompanying text.
201. For a discussion of the trend the Halpin decision may represent, see infra notes 224-
232 and accompanying text.
202. See Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 481-82.
203. See supra notes 22, 45-60 and accompanying text.
204. See Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 482.
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However, the decision to partially invalidate household exclusions will
create quite a clamor in the insurance industry. The trend the decision
represents and the impact of Halpin are discussed in later sections of this
note. 5 A critique of the Halpin decision indicates that upholding the
household exclusion would have created an anomaly in Missouri law.
The Halpin court recognized the impracticality of the FRL provisions for
alternative means of financial responsibility when it stated, "[I]t is apparent
that the great majority of motor vehicle owners will undertake to maintain
financial responsibility by means of motor vehicle liability policies."t2" The
court's pragmatic approach leads to the conclusion that in reality, the FRL is
a compulsory insurance law." 7 Because the FRL is practically a compulso-
ry insurance law, an exclusion clause renders the policyholder completely
uninsured concerning all exclusions. Thus, a literal application of insurance
contracts containing exclusions for household members, passengers, or the
named insured would provide coverage only to unrelated third parties injured
while operating a different vehicle. Permissive use and business use
exclusions0" would constrict coverage further in these particular situations.
This collage of exclusions would seriously frustrate the pronounced purpose
of the FRL.2°  Ruling household exclusions void as against the public
policy of the FRL was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the law.
The sound policy result reached in Halpin also comports with the
Hoerath interpretation of Missouri's uninsured motorist statute.10 Hoerath
created a situation where persons denied insurance coverage by a household
exclusion were not uninsured for purposes of uninsured motorist insur-
ance.2 ' The decision of the Hoerath court rendered a large class of injured
persons completely uninsured by the operation of exclusion clauses. Thus,
Hoerath allowed insurers to continue to use exclusion clauses to avoid
liability. The FRL and uninsured motorist statutes share the common purpose
of requiring minimal amounts of insurance coverage. The minimum insurance
coverage requirements for the uninsured motorist statute and the FRLP
are identical. Therefore, if the uninsured motorist statute had been interpreted
to encompass any person not insured by reason of a contract exclusion, the
result created by Halpin on the grounds of public policy would have been
achieved by reversing the Hoerath decision through a different interpretation
of the uninsured motorist statute. Whether insurance coverage is provided by
the FRL or the uninsured motorist statute is of little practical significance; the
205. See infra notes 224-52 and accompanying text.
206. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 481.
207. Id.
208. For a discussion of business use exclusions, see supra note 92. A permissive use
exclusion denies coverage to a person injured while using the insured's vehicle with the insured's
permission.
209. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
210. Hoerath v. McMahon, 669 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. CL App. 1984).
211. Id. at 283.
212. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 379.203, 303.030 (1986 & Supp. 1991).
213. Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.190 (1986). See supra note 17.
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important result is that insurers may not circumvent public policy of requiring
minimum insurance though the use of contract exclusions.
The Halpin majority's decision to invalidate the household exclusion only
up to the statutory minimum has a foundation in the FRL and Missouri case
law.214 The Halpin. court interpreted section 303.190.7215 and case law to
mean that the insured has no basis for expecting coverage in excess of the
statutory minimum amounts.216 The partial validity of household exclusions
still leaves exclusion clauses with a significant importance-the insurer's
liability from one accident can be no more than $50,000, even if the actual
damages suffered by all plaintiffs totals millions of dollars.
The court's decision to hold the exclusion partially invalid highlights an
important point: The public policy which renders the exclusion void emanates
specifically from the FRL, not from the general canons of public policy.
Thus, an exclusion in any type of insurance contract outside the scope of the
FRL will continue to be effective. Missouri courts, long recognizing the
freedom to bargain over terms in insurance contracts, subject only to the
requirements that the contract is lawful and reasonable, 217 have consistently
upheld exclusion clauses against arguments under the canons of general public
policy. The Missouri Supreme Court has recently determined that a family
exclusion clause is a reasonable term under general contract principles,
2 8
Exclusion clauses remain an effective weapon limiting the liability of insurers.
Despite the court's holding that household exclusions are acceptable, the
"objectively reasonable expectations""' theory can be offered as a strong
argument that exclusions such as the provision at issue in Halpin are
repugnant to general public policy and contract principles. It is surely a fair
assumption that most consumers want to protect their family members from
uncompensated injuries caused by the negligence of another family mem-
ber.' Undoubtedly, many consumers purchase insurance in the mistaken
belief that the scope of their coverage is enumerated on the "policy declara-
tions" page." However, a consumer's trust in the simple language of a
policy declaration page is controverted by obscure exclusion clauses buried
within an insurance contract. Courts and insurance companies are cognizant
of the fact that a large majority of consumers do not read the entire insurance
policy, and of the minority that do read the contract, few read the policy with
the caution and perception necessary to fully understand the provisions. 2
2
Disregarding these policy considerations, the Missouri Supreme Court "has not
214. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 176.
216. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 483.
217. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 789 S.W.2d 791,795 (Mo. 1990); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 340 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Mo. 1960).
218. Ward, 789 S.W.2d at 796.
219. See supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
220. Ashdown, supra note 121, at 258.
221. E.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dimmer, 773 P.2d 1012, 1019 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988); see supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
222. Keeton, supra note 115, at 968.
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determined the viability of the objective reasonable expectations doctrine in
Missouri. "'
B. Halpin as a Hallmark of a Trend in Missouri Law
Earlier sections of this Note have discussed the Missouri cases leading up
to the Halpin decision. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ward 4
stood for the proposition that household exclusions were valid under the
Safety Responsibility Law,' a prior Missouri law. However, Judge
Covington's concurring opinion in Ward, noting that the Ward result might
have been different under the FRL and current public policy,226 may have
been a precursor to the Halpin decision. Previous to the Halpin decision,
three Missouri Court of Appeals cases had ruled insurance contract exclusions
void as against the public policy enumerated in the FRL.27 Each of these
three cases invalidated a different type of exclusion: a passenger exclusion in
Dolphin,28 a business use exclusion in Salyer,29 and a household exclu-
sion in Monday. These three cases demarcate a clear trend in Missouri
law, a trend requiring the minimum statutory amounts of insurance free from
any type of contract exclusion. It is doubtful that any contract exclusion
would survive under the Halpin majority's interpretation of the public policy
espoused by the FRL.
Insurers fighting against an extension of Halpin to other types of contract
exclusions may argue that the partial invalidation of household exclusions was
simply a response to the abolition of parental immunity. 1  Insurers may
attempt to argue that exclusions are still fully valid against persons other than
children of the insured. However, the Halpin court dispelled any such
argument by implication. The court stated that the household exclusion
applied to "others [non-relatives] who never had the benefit of any doctrine
of immunity.'2 2 By asserting that the scope of the household exclusion is
more broad than the scope of parental immunity, the court has already
extended the Halpin decision beyond the scope of parental immunity.
223. Rodriguez v. General Accident Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. 1991).
See also Estrin Constr. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
224. 789 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1990).
225. Mo. Rnv. STAT. §§ 303.010-.370 (1986).
226. Ward, 789 S.W.2d at 797 (Covington, J., concurring).
227. Atlanta Casualty Co. v. Salyer, No. 17251, 1991 WL 216277, at*3 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct.
25, 1991) (business use exclusion); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Monday, No. WD44299,
1991 WL 179383, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1991) (household exclusion); American
Standard Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Dolphin, 801 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (passenger
exclusion).
228. Dolphin, 801 S.W.2d at 416.
229. Salyer, 1991 WL 216277, at *3.
230. Monday, 1991 WL 179383, at *4.
231. Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852, 858 (Mo. 1991).
232. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 482.
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C. The Collaboration of Halpin and the Abolition of Intrafamily
Immunities: A Sweeping Change Has Been Effected
The joint effect of the abolition of intrafamily immunities and the partial
invalidation of household exclusions will be resounding. The abolition of
intrafamily immunities has the procedural effect of allowing a cause of action
for negligent driving to be filed by one family member against another. If
family immunities had not been abolished, Halpin would have had little
practical effect, because the limited recovery allowed by Halpin would be
unavailable due to the procedural mechanism of intrafamily immunity.
In policies containing applicable exclusion clauses, partial invalidation
creates a potential recovery from insurance proceeds of $25,000 for an
individual to $50,000 for all parties injured in the accident by the negligence
of the driver. 3 The abolition of intrafamily immunities allows suits to be
filed against another family member, but if a household exclusion were
completely valid, the injured plaintiff could only recover directly from the
negligent family member. If household exclusions were completely valid,
potential lawsuits between family members would be discouraged, because the
unavailability of insurance funds would often allow only a reallocation of
family assets. After Halpin, injured parties can have a limited recovery from
the coffers of an insurance company. As a result, the number of lawsuits
spawned by the cooperation of the Halpin and Hartman decisions may be
quite high.
Various policy arguments support and oppose the practical result created
by the invalidation of household exclusions;" similar policy arguments
surround the issue of family immunities. The juxtaposition of the basic policy
arguments concerning intrafamily immunities creates an interesting contradic-
tion. One of the primary polic y reasons for maintaining immunities is the
protection of family harmony. Commentators have recognized that the
pervasiveness of liability insurance provides a good reason to abolish
intrafamily immunity.1 6 As liability insurance has become commonplace,
or nearly mandatory, the necessity of protecting family harmony through
intrafamily immunities has dissipated.' 7 However, the pervasiveness of
liability insurance has also created another reason to maintain family
immunities: the fear that the existence of insurance will induce families to
fraudulently create or exaggerate claims."
Concern about the potential for family collusion is the argument cited
most often for sustaining intrafamily immunities.239 Where the abolition of
immunity allows a cause of action between family members, the temptatation
233. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.190 (1986). See supra note 17.
234. See supra notes 73-96, 116-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of policy
arguments for and against the invalidation of household exclusions.
235. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d at 854.
236. Ashdown, supra note 121, at 248.
237. Id. at 245.
238. Id. at 248.
239. Id. at 251-52.
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of collusion is enticing. The family members involved may have been the
only witnesses to the accident, providing an opportunity to conceal defenses
and convolute facts.24 The insured family member, a nominal defendant,
will benefit in nearly every circumstance upon a successful injury claim by an
injured family member. Although judgment would be entered against the
insured driver, the insurance company would bear the financial burden of the
initial $25,000 (or $50,000, if more than one plaintiff is involved) of the
judgment. In many cases resulting in a judgment exceeding the minimum
statutory amounts, the amount not paid by the insurance company will either
go unpaid or will result in a ceremonial reallocation of family assets among
family members. Thus, the nominal defendant could well have a financial
incentive to conceal facts or even admit liability. Another factor inuring to
the benefit of a collusive intrafamily claim is that juries tend to find for the
plaintiff where it is suspected that liability insurance is involved.241 Those
supporting the potential intrafamily cause of action have cited several methods
of combatting collusion: the ability of the judicial system to ferret out
fraudulent claims,242 quick investigation of accidents by insurance compa-
nies,243 and the ability of an insurance company to examine and cross-
examine witnesses at trial.2'
Critics of the abolition of household exclusions and intrafamily
immunities have pounced upon the arguments discussed above. One member
of the judiciary surmised that allowing such a recovery between family
members "in effect transforms the ordinary automobile liability policy into one
providing health and accident coverage-where fault plays no part in the
recovery of benefits.""24  Although the judicial system may be able to
eliminate, or at least limit many fraudulent claims, insurance companies will
expend greater sums on damage awards overall. Because injured parties will
now have causes of action covered by insurance funds, insurance companies
will often find it beneficial to settle the proliferation of relatively small claims
filed by injured family members. The additional cost of damage and
settlement expenditures will, of course, be passed on to consumers through
higher premiums.
Undoubtedly, the Missouri Supreme Court considered the ramifications
of the abolition of parental immunity and the invalidation of household
exclusions in reaching the Halpin and Hartman decisions. The conflicts
among allowing recovery for injured plaintiffs, protecting the interests of
insurance companies from collusion, and protecting freedom of contract are
240. Id.
241. Id. at 250. Generally, rules of evidence protect against the admission of evidence as
to liability insurance, but, as the Oregon Supreme Court noted, 'juries are, as a Kentucky
mountaineer once said-'tolerable generous with other people's money,' especially when the
aroma of insurance permeates the courtroom." Smith v. Smith, 287 P.2d 572, 583 (Or. 1955).
242. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 622 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Wash. 1980).
243. Meyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 585, 591 (Colo. 1984) (citing
Sorenson v. Sorenson, 339 N.E.2d 907, 915 (Mass. 1975)).
244. Ashdown, supra note 121, at 251.
245. Immer v. Risko, 267 A.2d 481, 489 (N.J. 1980) (Francis, J., dissenting).
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apparent. The resolution of these conflicts by the Halpin court is most easily
understood upon an examination of the purpose of the statute and public
policy at issue. The Halpin majority resolved this conflict by interpreting the
FRL to promote a public policy of "mak[ing] sure that people who are injured
on the highways may collect damage awards, within limits, against negligent
motor vehicle operators."246 This interpretation provides for insurance
protection for all victims injured by negligent vehicle operators, regardless of
relation to the insured. One can assume that the Halpin rationale will be
applied equally to partially invalidate other types of insurance exclusions.
The FRL was clearly enacted with the purpose of requiring a minimum
amount of insurance. Requiring insurance coverage is the most common and
effective method of promoting the availability of compensation for those
injured in auto accidents.247 Availability of compensation is the underlying
purpose of any financial responsibility or compulsory insurance statute. To
allow insurance companies to contravene such a clear public policy by the use
of exclusion clauses is an undesirable result.
Courts that have upheld the validity of household exclusions have not
embraced a similar interpretation of public policy. In Transamerica Insurance
Co. v. Henry,248 the Indiana Supreme Court held that the state's financial
responsibility statute did not "'evince a social policy to guarantee compensa-
tion for all victims of automobile accidents.""' The Indiana court added
that the legislature did not intend to compel parents to buy liability insurance
to cover damage actions brought by their own children." As evidenced by
the contrasting results reached by Missouri and Indiana courts, an interpreta-
tion of the purpose of an insurance law is dispositive as to the validity of
contract exclusions.
The FRL implements the social policy of compensating injured victims.
The Missouri Supreme Court interprets the FRL to provide such compensa-
tion, regardless of status as family members. Despite providing an opportuni-
ty to concoct fraudulent claims, the collaboration of Halpin and the abolition
of intrafamily immunities enables a significant number of innocent, injured
parties to recover up to $25,000 or $50,0002' in insurance proceeds where
fault exists. In light of the abolition of intrafamily immunities, continued
support for the validity of household exclusions would have created an
incongruous result. Allowing an insurer to use exclusion clauses to circum-
vent the stated purpose of compensating injured victims is "analogous to
giving something with one hand while taking it away with the other."2 2
DAVID A. DICK
246. Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 482.
247. Ashdown, supra note 121, at 252-53.
248. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Henry, 563 N.E.2d 1265 (Ind. 1990).
249. Id. at 1268 (brackets omitted).
250. Id. at 1269.
251. Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.190 (1986). See supra note 17.
252. Ashdown, supra note 121, at 255.
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